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ARIZONA v. JOHNSON:
DETERMINING WHEN A TERRY
STOP BECOMES CONSENSUAL
RYAN THOMPSON*

I. INTRODUCTION
On September 10, 2007, the Arizona Court of Appeals reversed
the conviction of Lemon Johnson and remanded the case for a new
trial.1 Johnson had been convicted of unlawful possession of a weapon
and possession of marijuana. The illicit items were discovered when
police conducted a protective pat-down search of Johnson, who was a
passenger in a car that was detained in a routine traffic stop.2 Johnson
argued, inter alia, that his conviction should have been reversed
because the trial court erred when it denied his motion to suppress
the evidence.3 Specifically, he argued that he was unlawfully “seized”
because a routine traffic stop does not automatically seize passengers
and, in absence of this seizure, that Officer Trevizo did not have an
articulable basis upon which to seize him. Alternatively, he argued
that even if he had been seized, by the time he was searched, the
limited-duration Terry-stop had become a consensual encounter in
which Officer Trevizo would have needed an independent articulable
basis to search him. Thus, according to Johnson, the search violated
his Fourth Amendment rights and the evidence discovered during
that search should have been suppressed.4
Though a recent and unrelated United States Supreme Court case
5
settled the question of seizure, the Arizona Court of Appeals held
that “when an officer initiates an investigative encounter with a

*
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.

2010 J.D. Candidate, Duke University School of Law.
State v. Johnson, 170 P.3d 667, 668, 674 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2007).
Id. at 669.
Id. at 668.
Id. at 671.
Id. (citing Brendlin v. California, 127 S. Ct. 2400, 2410 (2007)).
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passenger that was consensual and wholly unconnected to the original
purposes of the routine traffic stop of the driver, that officer may not
conduct a Terry frisk of the passenger without reasonable cause to
6
believe ‘criminal activity may be afoot.’” On June 23, 2008, the
United States Supreme Court granted the State’s petition for a writ of
certiorari.7
II. FACTS
At 9:00 p.m. on April 19, 2002, three Oro Valley police officers,
including Officer Maria Trevizo, were on patrol near Sugar Hill, an
area of Tucson associated with the Crips street gang.8 While routinely
running the license plates of vehicles in the area, the officers stopped
a car that had a mandatory insurance suspension.9 As she approached
the vehicle, Officer Trevizo noticed that the occupant of the back seat,
10
Johnson, was exhibiting unusual behavior. First, she observed that he
had a police scanner in his jacket, which she felt was an unusual thing
for somebody to be carrying.11 Additionally, she noticed that Johnson
12
13
was wearing all blue, the chosen color of the Crips. These factors,
combined with the fact that Johnson stated that he did not have any
identification and had been convicted of a felony, led Officer Trevizo
to suspect that Johnson may have been a gang member.14
Johnson’s possible gang affiliation disconcerted Officer Trevizo
because, due to her extensive training as a gang task force officer, she
15
knew that gang members generally tend to possess firearms. Though
she was concerned for her safety, Officer Trevizo did not have any
indication that “Johnson was engaged in . . . or about to engage in
criminal activity.”16 One of the officers then ordered all of the
individuals in the car to display their hands.17 Additionally, one of the

6. Id. at 674 (quoting Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 30 (1968)).
7. Johnson, 170 P.3d 667, cert. granted, 128 S. Ct. 2961 (U.S. June 23, 2008) (No. 07-1122).
8. Johnson, 170 P.3d at 668.
9. Id.
10. Id. at 669. Particularly, Johnson was alternately watching the officers as they
approached and making comments to his friends in the front seats, something that struck
Officer Trevizo as unusual.
11. Joint Appendix at 16, Johnson, 128 S. Ct. 2961 (No. 07-1122).
12. Id. at 17.
13. Id. at 18.
14. Id. at 19.
15. Id. at 10.
16. Id. at 29.
17. State v. Johnson, 170 P.3d 667, 669 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2007).
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officers ordered the driver to exit the vehicle and gathered
information from him.18
While her colleague dealt with the driver, Officer Trevizo
19
questioned Johnson as he sat in the rear seat of the car. Because he
exhibited signs of gang affiliation, Officer Trevizo hoped that Johnson
could provide some information that would help the gang task force
20
in combating criminal gang activities. At some point during the
dialogue, Officer Trevizo asked Johnson to exit the vehicle so that she
and Johnson would not be overheard by the other passenger.21
Because she suspected that Johnson might have been armed and thus
posed a threat to the safety of the officers, Officer Trevizo told
Johnson after he exited the car that she was going to pat him down to
22
make sure that he had no weapons. She then conducted the
23
contested search. When the pat-down search revealed that Johnson
had a handgun, he began to struggle and Officer Trevizo subdued and
24
handcuffed him. Johnson was promptly disarmed and taken into
custody.
III. LEGAL BACKGROUND
All cases in this discrete line of constitutional jurisprudence fall
under the umbrella of Terry v. Ohio, in which the Supreme Court held
that a police officer may stop a person if he reasonably suspects that
the person has committed or is in the process of committing a crime.25
Under Terry, a person is seized when, “by means of physical force or
26
show of authority,” police action “terminates or restrains his freedom
of movement.”27 Once the officer makes a seizure, he may then
conduct a pat-down search to ensure that the suspect is not armed
28
and to preserve evidence.
As law enforcement officials have attempted to constitutionally
apply this concept, subsequent cases have further illuminated when

18.
19.
20.
21.
22.
23.
24.
25.
26.
27.
28.

Id. at 669.
Id.
Joint Appendix, supra note 11, at 19.
Johnson, 170 P.3d at 669.
Joint Appendix, supra note 11, at 20.
Id.
Id. at 24.
Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 30 (1968).
Id. at 19 n.16.
Florida v. Bostick, 501 U.S. 429, 434 (1991).
United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218, 234 (1973).

DO NOT DELETE

12/30/2008 4:57:21 PM

148 DUKE JOURNAL OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW & PUBLIC POLICY SIDEBAR [VOL. 4:145

seizures occur and who may be seized. As articulated by the Supreme
Court in United States v. Mendenhall, a person has been seized if “in
view of all of the circumstances surrounding the incident, a
reasonable person would have believed that he was not free to
leave.”29 Delaware v. Prouse made clear that during a traffic stop, the
driver of the vehicle is lawfully seized30 and, in Brendlin v. California,
the Supreme Court unanimously voted to adhere to previous dicta,
formally expanding the scope of the seizure to include passengers of
the vehicle.31
A. Recent Supreme Court Cases
Brendlin and Knowles v. Iowa are two recent Supreme Court cases
that are instructive in applying the Terry doctrine to the Johnson case.
As mentioned, Brendlin held that a traffic stop seizes passengers of
the vehicle in addition to the driver. In Knowles, the Supreme Court
disallowed full “field-type” searches in the context of traffic stops but
stated that police may order a driver and passengers from the vehicle
and conduct pat-down searches “upon reasonable suspicion that they
may be armed and dangerous.”32
In Brendlin, police stopped a vehicle with expired registration and
an ostensibly legitimate temporary registration (issued while an
application for renewal was pending) in order to verify that the
permit matched the vehicle.33 While the driver spoke with the police,
one of the officers noticed that the driver’s passenger was one of the
“Brendlin brothers,” one of whom was in violation of his parole.34
When the police discovered that the passenger was indeed the
35
wayward brother, he was arrested. A search incident to arrest
revealed methamphetamine and equipment commonly used to
36
manufacture the drug.
At the trial hearing to suppress the evidence uncovered by the
search, Brendlin unsuccessfully argued that he was unlawfully seized

29.
30.
31.
32.
33.
34.
35.
36.

United States v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544, 545 (1980).
Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 659–60 (1979).
Brendlin v. California, 127 S. Ct. 2400, 2410 (2007).
Knowles v. Iowa, 525 U.S. 113, 117–18 (1998).
Brendlin v. California, 127 S. Ct. 2400, 2404 (2007).
Id.
Id.
Id.
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as a result of the traffic stop.37 The California Court of Appeals held
that the traffic stop effectively seized Brendlin and, because the stop
itself was unlawful, the court reversed the denial of Brendlin’s motion
38
to suppress. The California Supreme Court reversed, invoking the
concepts of power and authority articulated in Terry and stating that a
passenger cannot meaningfully submit to police authority and
39
therefore cannot be seized in a traffic stop. Instead, the California
Supreme Court of California held that a passenger is seized only if the
stop is accompanied by some additional facts that would indicate that
the passenger was not free to go and was subject to the control of the
police.40
The Brendlin case gave the United States Supreme Court occasion
to consider whether police, in executing a traffic stop, seize persons
who are passengers within the stopped vehicle.41 In light of Terry and
its progeny, the Court framed the analysis as “whether a reasonable
person in Brendlin’s position when the car stopped would have
believed himself free to terminate the encounter between the police
and himself.”42
Writing for the unanimous Court, Justice Souter explained that
the general public would not expect the police to distinguish between
the driver and the passenger during a traffic stop.43 The Court pointed
to a number of cases that support this view, emphasizing that the
intentional application of governmental control and the perception of
the persons seized were the most important factors for evaluation
rather than the subjective intent of the officer to stop the driver and
his ambivalence toward the passengers at the time of the stop.44
Additionally, the Court noted that, as opposed to the obvious seizure
that occurs when a fleeing suspect is physically restrained, a stationary

37. Id. The trial court determined that he was seized only when the police officer ordered
him out of the car immediately prior to his arrest.
38. Id.
39. Id. at 2404–05.
40. Id.
41. Id. at 2403.
42. Id. at 2405–06 (quoting Florida v. Bostick, 501 U.S. 429, 435–36 (1991)) (internal
quotations omitted).
43. Id. at 2407 (“If the likely wrongdoing is not the driving, the passenger will reasonably
feel subject to suspicion owing to close association; but even when the wrongdoing is only bad
driving, the passenger will expect to be subject to some scrutiny, and his attempt to leave the
scene would be so obviously likely to prompt an objection from the officer than no passenger
would feel free to leave in the first place.”).
44. Id. at 2407–08.
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suspect may submit to seizure merely by staying where he is.45 As a
result, the Court held that police had effectively seized Brendlin when
they stopped the car, despite the fact that he was merely a passenger
46
and not the target of the stop itself
The Knowles case evaluated an Iowa law that gave officers the
option to issue citations for traffic violations or to arrest offending
47
drivers and bring them before magistrates for further proceedings.
As interpreted by the Iowa Supreme Court, this statutory option
authorized police to conduct a “search incident to citation” if they
48
decided to cite rather than to arrest offenders. In Knowles, an Iowa
police officer stopped a motorist and cited him for speeding.49 After
issuing the citation, the officer proceeded to conduct a full “field50
51
type” search of the automobile. In the course of his search, the
officer discovered marijuana and a pipe, presumably used to smoke
the marijuana.52 The officer arrested the motorist for violation of
53
Iowa’s controlled substances laws.
Before trial, the motorist unsuccessfully moved to suppress the
54
evidence and was subsequently convicted. On appeal, the United
States Supreme Court analyzed the justifications articulated in United
55
States v. Robinson for the sort of full “field-type” exploratory search
56
performed here. The Court invoked the dual concerns of officer
safety and of the need to preserve evidence in the context of a lawful
arrest, and then proceeded to explore the factual similarities between
an arrest and a traffic stop.57 The Court explained that a traffic stop is
more closely related to a traditional Terry stop than to a full arrest
because the “proximity, stress, and uncertainty” that make arrest so
dangerous are not as prevalent in the context of a traffic stop.58 As a
result, the Court held that these traditional concerns do not, by
45. Id. at 2408.
46. Id. at 2410.
47. Id.
48. Id. at 115–116.
49. Id. at 114.
50. This type of search would encompass the entire automobile, which makes it more
expansive than a Terry search.
51. Id.
52. Id.
53. Id. at 114–15.
54. Id. at 114.
55. United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218, 234–35 (1973).
56. Id. at 116–17.
57. Id. at 117.
58. Id.
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themselves, permit police to conduct full investigatory searches during
traffic stops.59
Citing Terry, however, the Court then explained that this still left
police officers with several procedures with which to preserve their
safety. At the top of a laundry list of possible protections available to
police officers during a routine traffic stop, the Court explicitly
suggested that an officer may order both the driver and his passengers
out of the car and may conduct pat-down searches of all parties “upon
60
reasonable suspicion that they may be armed and dangerous.”
B. Arizona Cases
In addition to the Supreme Court cases above, the Arizona Court
of Appeals also relied heavily upon two Arizona cases, In re Ilono H.61
62
and State v. Navarro, during its analysis of the Johnson case. In both
cases, the Arizona Court of Appeals determined that the searches
were unconstitutional because they occurred during consensual
encounters between law enforcement officials and civilians. Ilono H.
held that officers cannot lawfully conduct a protective pat-down
search in the context of a consensual encounter63 and Navarro yielded
the proposition that a legitimate Terry stop may become a consensual
64
encounter.
In Ilono H., two officers approached five individuals in a park that
had a reputation for drug activity.65 They noted that many of the
individuals were dressed in baggy red clothing, a color associated with
gang activity,66 which caused the officers concern because, as one of
67
the officers later testified, gang members often carry weapons.
Following a short dialogue, the officers conducted pat-down searches
of the five individuals, found that Ilono was concealing a 40-ounce
beer in his clothes, and arrested him for illegal possession of alcohol.68
While conducting a search incident to the arrest, the officers found

59.
60.
61.
62.
63.
64.
65.
66.
67.
68.

Id. at 118–19.
Id. at 117–18.
In re Ilono H., 113 P.3d 696 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2005).
State v. Navarro, 34 P.3d 971 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2001).
Ilono H., 113 P.3d at 699.
Navarro, 34 P.3d at 297.
Ilono H., 113 P.3d at 697.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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cocaine in one of Ilono’s pockets.69 The juvenile court rejected Ilono’s
claim that the search was impermissible under Terry and declined to
suppress the cocaine evidence.70 Ilono, after his conviction, appealed.71
On appeal, the Arizona Court of Appeals established first that a
Terry stop is permissible only when officers have reasonable suspicion
that the person is or will shortly be engaged in criminal activity.72 The
court contrasted this Terry stop with a consensual encounter, which an
officer may initiate at any time but is subject to termination at the will
of the person detained.73 From these two propositions, the court
reasoned that it would be illogical to suggest that a person who could
not be lawfully detained could still be subjected to a pat-down search
during a consensual encounter.74 This is in keeping with the court’s
earlier articulation of the proposition that “an officer’s right to
conduct a pat-down search should be predicated on the officer’s right
to initiate an investigatory stop in the first instance.”75 The court held
that the officers had no right to initiate an investigatory stop because
76
they had no reasonable suspicion that Ilono had committed a crime.
Because they had no right to stop Ilono, the officers therefore had no
77
right to conduct a pat-down search during the consensual encounter.
In Navarro, police stopped a car near the scene of a shooting that
78
had taken place a few hours earlier. One occupant of the car,
Navarro, a thin Hispanic man in a red shirt and jeans, matched the
description of the shooter and was handcuffed and questioned by
police.79 After a brief discussion, Navarro was relieved of his
80
handcuffs and asked to accompany an officer to the police station.
Navarro was never cited for anything and was never told that he was
free to go; however, he also never expressed a desire to leave.81 The
officer invited the unrestrained youth to sit in the front passenger seat

69. Id.
70. Id.
71. Id.
72. Id.
73. Id. at 698.
74. Id. at 700.
75. Id.
76. Id. at 700–01.
77. Id.
78. State v. Navarro, 34 P.3d 971, 973 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2001).
79. Id.
80. Id. It is unclear whether the police removed the handcuffs before, during, or after
Navarro decided to go to the station with the officer.
81. Id.

DO NOT DELETE

12/30/2008 4:57:21 PM

ARIZONA V. JOHNSON

2008]

153

of his unmarked car, suggesting that he buckle his seat belt. When
they got to the police station, the officer left Navarro unattended in
the interrogation room while he left to buy Navarro a drink.82 Navarro
agreed to be photographed and fingerprinted and to have his
83
testimony taped. Navarro acknowledged that he was aware of his
Miranda rights and signed consent forms to permit the use of his
84
testimony. This information was later used to convict Navarro, who
unsuccessfully moved to suppress the evidence on the grounds that it
was illegally obtained.85
On appeal, Navarro contended that his legal detention for
investigatory purposes became an illegal arrest when the police took
him to the station and that his compliance with officers’ requests
exhibited an acceptance of his fate, not consent to the investigation.86
The court disagreed with both contentions, and held that Navarro was
neither in custody nor under arrest when he decided to accompany
the officer to the police station because “[u]nder the circumstances, a
reasonable, innocent person would have felt free to decline [the
officer]’s request to accompany him for questioning downtown.”87 As
a result, the Court of Appeals upheld the trial court’s determination
that the information obtained during the interrogation should not be
suppressed.88
IV. HOLDING
In State v. Johnson, the Arizona Court of Appeals held that the
evidence found during Officer Trevizo’s search of Johnson should be
suppressed and the case remanded for a new trial.89 The court stated
that Johnson was initially seized when police lawfully stopped the car
90
in which he was riding. Though Officer Trevizo could have ordered
all passengers from the vehicle at that time, she failed to do so.91 The
lapse in time between the stop and the actual exercise of police
authority over Johnson is especially important because, combined

82.
83.
84.
85.
86.
87.
88.
89.
90.
91.

Id.
Id. at 973–74.
Id.
Id. at 972.
Id. at 974–75.
Id.
Id. at 977.
Id. at 674.
Id. at 671.
Id. at 672.
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with Officer Trevizo’s polite and unthreatening manner, it caused a
lawful Terry stop to transition into a consensual stop.92 Additionally,
Officer Trevizo did not have an articulable basis upon which to
suspect that Johnson was committing or had committed a crime and
so she could not have justifiably initiated a Terry stop.93 Trevizo and
Johnson were thus engaged in a consensual encounter that Johnson
was free to terminate at any time, and in such a consensual situation
Trevizo could not lawfully conduct a search of Johnson without his
consent.94 Therefore, when Officer Trevizo conducted a protective patdown search and uncovered a firearm, she violated Johnson’s Fourth
95
Amendment rights and triggered the exclusionary rule.
In State v. Johnson, the Court of Appeals of Arizona first
explained the Terry v. Ohio framework as it was presented in In re
Ilono H.96 In detailing the pertinent facts of that case, the court
stressed that, although a lawful investigatory Terry stop allows officers
to conduct a pat-down search to ensure officer safety, a consensual
stop does not.97 The court pointed out that Ilono H. had reaffirmed
that the validity of a protective search rests upon the validity of the
98
initial stop.
Drawing on the Supreme Court’s holding in Brendlin v. California,
the court agreed that Johnson had been lawfully seized within the
meaning of the Fourth Amendment when the car in which he was a
99
passenger was lawfully stopped. The court then evaluated Johnson’s
claim that, even if he had been lawfully seized, Officer Trevizo was not
entitled to conduct a protective pat-down search because the
interaction “had evolved into a consensual encounter before Trevizo
patted him down.”100 In evaluating this claim, the court first
considered the circumstances under which a custodial detention
becomes a consensual encounter. The court cited a number of cases
suggesting that a traffic stop becomes a consensual encounter when
an officer hands the driver his license and registration and issues him

92.
93.
94.
95.
96.
97.
98.
99.
100.

Id. at 673.
Id. at 672.
Id.
See id. at 674.
State v. Johnson, 170 P.3d 667, 670 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2007).
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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a citation or warning.101 Although the court found no case law
establishing such a point regarding passengers, it reasoned that, at
some point, a passenger must be free to walk away from the scene of
102
the traffic stop.
In deciding exactly when this change of
circumstances occurs, the court stated that it was compelled to apply a
standard of reasonableness.103
Proceeding with a more in-depth analysis, the court then
elaborated on consensual encounters, stating that an encounter is
consensual if a civilian voluntarily cooperates with police, absent
coercive use or threat of power.104 On the other hand, an encounter is
not consensual if a reasonable person would not feel free to disregard
law enforcement officials and carry on as he otherwise would.105
Applying these principles to the facts presented in Johnson, the court
noted that Officer Trevizo’s purpose in speaking with Johnson was
unrelated to the traffic stop.106 The court also emphasized that Officer
Trevizo believed that Johnson was free to terminate the encounter at
107
any time. After acknowledging that the subjective belief of an
officer is only instructive if the officer communicates it to the civilian
in some way, the court pointed out that Officer Trevizo did not
communicate “to him [Johnson] that his encounter with her was
anything other than consensual.”108
The court next examined State v. Navarro and compared the facts
in that case to those in Johnson.109 After deciding that Navarro had
been subject to a greater level of coercion than had Johnson, the court
held that the encounter was consensual because the reasonable
person, in Johnson’s position, would have believed himself free to
remain in the vehicle.110 Because it found that the encounter was
consensual, the Arizona Court of Appeals held any evidence found
111
during Officer Trevizo’s search should be suppressed.

101.
102.
103.
104.
105.
106.
107.
108.
109.
110.
111.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 672.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 672–73.
Id. at 673.
Id. at 674.
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Judge Philip Espinosa argued in dissent that the majority had not
only disregarded settled law but had also placed police in greater
peril.112 The dissent pointed to language in Ilono H. that stated that
the lawful nature of a pat-down search should rest upon the legality of
113
the original Terry stop. Because Johnson was lawfully seized as a
result of the traffic stop, the dissent argued that the trial court’s
114
decision was correct. Furthermore, the dissent stated that Arizona
courts have long recognized that the right of an Arizona police officer
to conduct a protective pat-down search of a passenger of a stopped
115
vehicle comes from a “reasonable concern for his safety.” During
the course of a lawful traffic stop, once Officer Trevizo reasonably
believed that Johnson was armed and could pose a threat, she was
justified in conducting a protective pat-down search for the weapon
that she found.116 Because of these factors, the dissent concluded that
the pat-down search was lawful and that the evidence should not be
suppressed.
V. ANALYSIS
The adjudication of this case necessarily requires the balancing of
extremely weighty interests. The Fourth Amendment is critical to
protecting the right of a person to avoid unreasonable governmental
intrusion into his life. Johnson’s claim draws on this ideal, which
resonates with fundamental ideals of individualism and privacy but
which conflicts with the concern for the safety of the men and women
who protect citizens from criminals. As a result, rather than interpret
the Fourth Amendment to flatly prohibit warrantless searches, the
Supreme Court has made the warrant requirement a general rule, but
one that has a number of exceptions. In Terry v. Ohio and its progeny,
the Supreme Court has continued to invoke safety interests to
construct a suitable framework that will concurrently protect law
enforcement officials from dangerous criminals and innocent civilians
from unreasonable governmental interference.
In Johnson, the Arizona Court of Appeals has produced a
standard that, in addition to being highly attenuated and practically
unworkable, disrupts the delicate balance that the Supreme Court has
112.
113.
114.
115.
116.

Id. at 674 (Espinosa, J., dissenting).
Id.
Id.
Id. (quoting State v. Riley, 992 P.2d 1135, 1140 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1999)).
Id.
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been carefully crafting for decades. Although the Supreme Court has
not explicitly held that passengers may be ordered out of a lawfully
stopped vehicle and subjected to protective pat-down searches if
police suspect that they are armed and dangerous, it has stated in
dicta that this and more is permissible.117 Additionally, in Brendlin v.
California, the Supreme Court said of traffic seizures that “a sensible
person would not expect a police officer to allow people to come and
go freely from the physical focal point of an investigation.”118 By
claiming to not reach this issue in Johnson, the Arizona Court of
Appeals avoided contradicting Supreme Court dicta but propagated a
rule that creates tension between the Supreme Court’s Fourth
Amendment jurisprudence and its own.
If this outcome were the product of adherence to binding
precedent or of applying clear and accepted constitutional principles,
perhaps the Johnson case would be more understandable. The court,
however, based its most crucial determinations upon an overlynuanced reading of the Navarro case, which is quite dissimilar from
the Johnson case.
First, the events in the Navarro case, which the Arizona court cited
for the proposition that a custodial stop can transition into a
consensual encounter, took place over a substantially long period of
time.119 During that time, Navarro was accosted by police, led away
from the vehicle for conversation, handcuffed but not given a
protective pat-down search, and then was invited back to the police
station, un-handcuffed, allowed to ride in the front passenger seat of
the police officer’s vehicle, left unattended at the police station, and
given a beverage.120 In that situation, the apparent shift in police
interaction with the suspect is even more striking than the passage of
hours between the original Terry stop and the termination of the
police interaction. Thus, although the police initiated the encounter
with Navarro in a clearly authoritarian manner, the subsequent
removal of his handcuffs, a major symbol of police authority, could
reasonably be understood to indicate an end to the compelled
encounter.

117.
118.
119.
120.

Knowles v. Iowa, 525 U.S. 111, 117–18 (1998).
Brendlin v. California, 127 S. Ct. 2400, 2407 (2007).
Johnson, 170 P.3d at 676.
State v. Navarro, 34 P.3d 971, 973–74 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2001).
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Second, the Navarro case did not present the danger, stress, and
uncertainty that have long been considered crucial to the justification
of protective pat-down searches.121 In contrast to the events of the
Navarro case, the Johnson case presented a short traffic stop,
conducted at night, involving multiple civilians displaying indicia of
gang activity, and in which police interaction with civilians was
consistent throughout the stop.
To buttress its analysis in Johnson, the majority pointed to Officer
Trevizo’s testimony that, in her opinion, Johnson was under no
obligation to get out of the car and could have refused to exit the
vehicle when instructed to do so. The court correctly articulated that
an officer’s subjective intent is only relevant insofar as the officer
communicates it, but it did not point to any of Officer Trevizo’s
actions that would have communicated her subjective belief to
Johnson. Instead, the court used a completely opposite rule; it shifted
the burden to the state by assuming that the subjective intent was
conveyed because Officer Trevizo did not act in a threatening or
otherwise coercive manner.
Contrary to the court’s assessment, the Joint Appendix indicated
that Officer Trevizo’s interaction with Johnson, though polite and
professional, was not consensual and was never suggested to be
consensual. For example, although she did not use any physical
force,122 Officer Trevizo said that she did not ask for Johnson’s
permission to search him.123 It is equally clear that Johnson’s
compliance is most accurately characterized as acquiescence. Johnson
124
never expressed an unwillingness to comply, but it stands to reason
that a man currently engaged in a felony would not interact with
125
police to any degree beyond that to which he felt obliged.
Furthermore, Johnson contended that he had never consented, as
indicated when defense counsel at the suppression hearing said:

121. See Knowles v. Iowa, 525 U.S. 111, 117 (1998).
122. Joint Appendix, supra note 11, at 50–51.
123. Id. at 34.
124. Id. at 49–51.
125. This is curiously at odds with a portion of the Supreme Court’s Terry jurisprudence, in
which a significant number of cases have held that felons will often consensually interact with
the police. See, e.g., United States v. Drayton, 536 U.S. 194, 199–200 (2002) (evidencing that
felons do, in fact, cooperate with police in situations where they felt or should have felt free to
terminate the encounter).
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“There’s not consent here. The context is clearly not indicative of
consent.”126
It is fairly clear that the passage of time and the marked shift in
police demeanor toward the civilian, sufficient to signal a transition
into a consensual encounter in the Navarro case, are simply not
analogous to the brief nature of the traffic stop and the polite but
unquestioning demeanor of the officer in Johnson. Furthermore, the
danger, stress, and uncertainty of the stop in the Johnson case suggest
that police in that circumstance should be given greater leeway than
the police in the Navarro case. If no communication was made to the
127
civilian that the lawful stop had terminated, it is illogical to suggest
that the passage of a few minutes or the use of a polite tone of voice
would indicate to the passenger that he is free to ignore police
requests or to walk away from the car and pursue his own destiny. As
a result, the court should have agreed with Johnson’s original position:
that the entire encounter between the police and Johnson was not
consensual. This, however, would not help Johnson: without the initial
Terry stop evolving into a consensual encounter, Officer Trevizo was
justified in searching Johnson for her safety.128
VI. CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated, the Supreme Court will probably reverse
the holding of the Arizona Court of Appeals, which was to suppress
the evidence against Johnson. Given the unanimity of the Court in
deciding Brendlin v. California and Knowles v. Iowa and its relatively
undisturbed ideological composition, it seems very likely that the
Court will continue this trend. Furthermore, as detailed above, the
Court of Appeals’s decision was reached only through a number of
novel determinations, any one of which the Supreme Court may
reject, resulting in a reversal. For instance, the Supreme Court may
hold that, in the context of a traffic stop, police may conduct
protective pat-down searches of civilian occupants at any time.
Alternatively, it may reject the notion that a consensual encounter
may arise out of a lawful traffic stop or hold that, while possible, the

126. Id. at 52.
127. For instance, when an officer writes the driver a citation, hands him the citation and his
license and registration, and tells him that he is free to leave.
128. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 30 (1968).
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circumstances necessary for such a transition were not present in the
Johnson case.
The most reasonable disposition that the Court could adopt in
reversing the Arizona Court of Appeals would be that a consensual
stop may evolve from a valid Terry stop, but only under some
combination of circumstances that are clearly indicative of a
consensual interaction: the passage of a long period of time; a marked
shift in police attitudes and interaction; and/or purposive
communication to the civilian that he is free to go. Such a decision will
continue to safeguard the rights of individual citizens while staunchly
preserving the safety of the brave men and women who are sworn to
protect and serve.

